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Notes
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF
TEACHER INSTRUCTIONAL SPEECH
WALTER E. KUHN
INTRODUCTION
Rarely is a constitutional controversy exemplified by a
Hollywood actor and industrial hemp. Actor Woody Harrelson, of
“Cheers” and “White Men Can’t Jump” fame, visited tenured
Kentucky fifth-grade teacher Donna Cockrel and her class on two
occasions in 1996 and 1997 to discuss industrial hemp with the
students.1 He had prior official approval for the visits2 and brought
along an “entourage, including representatives of the Kentucky
Hemp Museum and Kentucky Hemp Growers Cooperative
Association, several hemp growers from foreign countries, CNN, and
various Kentucky news media representatives.”3 The actor “spoke
with the children about his opposition to marijuana use, yet he
distinguished marijuana from industrial hemp, and advocated the use
of industrial hemp as an alternative to increased logging.”4 He also
showed the class products made from hemp and hemp seeds, a
5
banned substance in Kentucky. In July 1997, after the second visit
and an uncustomary review of her teaching methods,6 Ms. Cockrel

Copyright © 2006 by Walter E. Kuhn.
1. Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1042–43 (6th Cir. 2001).
2. Id. The principal claimed that “he was only told that the presentation to be given was
about agriculture,” before the first visit. After that visit, the superintendent “adopted a new
visitors policy for ‘controversial’ topics” and told Ms. Cockrel that “it would not be in her best
interests if Harrelson made any more visits to her class.” In the end, though, Ms. Cockrel
followed the visitors policy and each visit was approved. Id.
3. Id. at 1042.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1042–43.
6. See id. at 1044 (explaining that Ms. Cockrel was the only tenured teacher at her school
to be evaluated after two years instead of the customary three).
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was terminated by the school district, allegedly over concerns about
7
her teacher performance. On June 4, 1998, Ms. Cockrel filed suit in
federal district court, claiming that she was terminated in retaliation
for exercising her First Amendment right to free speech by inviting
Mr. Harrelson to make a presentation about industrial hemp to her
class.8
Although Ms. Cockrel ultimately prevailed when the Sixth
Circuit reversed the district court and held her speech was
constitutionally protected,9 difficult issues remain. This odd set of
facts raises a number of important questions. For example, how
should the courts balance the right of teachers to speak freely as
individuals with the right of schools to control their message to
students? Who controls, and who should control, curricula
development? To what extent should schools be allowed to
homogenize, and teachers be allowed to personalize, curricula? How
should the law arrive at the correct balance between exposing
students to a diversity of ideas to stimulate independent thought, and
impressing upon students lasting societal values? The stakes are high,
as the answers to these questions implicate everything from the civil
liberties of individual citizens in their roles as governmental
functionaries, to the homogeneity of the government’s message to
students and democracy’s need for young people to develop the
ability to thing independently and follow societal norms.
This Note argues that the current tests for deciding cases
involving First Amendment protection of teacher instructional speech
are inappropriate, and that a hybrid test should be adopted. Part I
discusses background issues and introduces the two precedents
currently used to decide instructional speech cases, Hazelwood and
Pickering. Part II describes the evolution of the Pickering test and
analyzes its benefits and shortcomings. Part III similarly evaluates the
Hazelwood test. Finally, Part IV advocates the use of a hybrid test to
decide future instructional speech cases and explores the possible
outcomes of such a test. This Note concludes that a hybrid test would

7. See id. at 1045 (indicating that Ms. Cockrel was terminated for deficient
“communication with parents regarding student performance and teacher expectations;
documentation of lesson plans; showing ‘consistent sensitivity to individual academic, physical,
social, and cultural differences and respond[ing] to all students in a caring manner;’ and acting
in accordance with laws and with school regulations and procedures”).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1055.
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expand teacher freedom in the classroom by applying different
standards for content and process restrictions of instructional speech.
I. PRELIMINARY ISSUES
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that public
school teachers have First Amendment rights within the confines of
the schoolhouse, it has never specifically addressed the degree of
protection that the First Amendment provides for in-class
instructional speech.10 The protection of in-class speech implicates at
least two competing interests: a teacher’s right to expression under
the First Amendment and a school system’s right to set its curriculum
11
and restrict the speech of its employees. While teachers do not “shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate,”12 nor does the state discard its interest in
13
safeguarding its message by regulating the speech of its employees.
Further complicating the issue is the Supreme Court’s conception
of the goals of the public school system. At times, the Court has
suggested that education demands open-mindedness and expression
14
of multiple opinions, but at others it has indicated that primary and
secondary schools play a unique role in inculcating fundamental
15
societal values. The competing and sometimes conflicting aims of the
10. Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001); Kara
Lynn Grice, Note, Striking an Unequal Balance: The Fourth Circuit Holds that Public School
Teachers Do Not Have First Amendment Rights to Set Curricula in Boring v. Buncombe County
Board of Education, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1960, 1960 (1999); Jacinto Zavala, Comment, Teachers
Beware! You May Be Liable Under Proposition 227: California Teachers Association v. State
Board of Education, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 493, 499 (2003).
11. Grice, supra note 10, at 1960.
12. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
13. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)
(stating that when a school speaks through its employees, it can “regulate the content of what is
or is not expressed”).
14. Gregory A. Clarick, Note, Public School Teachers and the First Amendment: Protecting
the Right to Teach, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 718–19 (1990) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969), and W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 637 (1943)).
15. The Supreme Court in Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), held of
the importance of such a role:
The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to
books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example the shared
values of a civilized social order. Consciously or otherwise, teachers—and indeed the
older students—demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and political
expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of class.
Id. at 683; see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76–80 (1979).
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educational system are to expose students to a broad variety of ideas
and “develop inquisitive minds and independent thought” by
promoting tolerance of unpopular and controversial views, and
provide “intellectual and moral guidance” by endorsing community
16
values necessary to the maintenance of a democracy. The first goal
cannot be accomplished without giving teachers a measure of free
expression and academic freedom, while the second justifies
limitations on teachers’ classroom expression.17
This Part outlines the competing interests implicated by
instructional speech cases. First, Subpart A analyzes teachers’
interests in freedom of expression as citizens and academics. Second,
Subpart B examines the state’s interest as an employer in regulating
the speech of its employees. Third, Subpart C considers students’
interest in being exposed to a variety of viewpoints. Finally, Subpart
D briefly introduces the two cases currently used to decide
instructional speech cases.
A. Teachers’ Interests in Free Expression and Academic Freedom
To effectuate the goal of introducing students to a broad
spectrum of ideas, courts have recognized some constitutional
academic freedom protections within the classroom, at least for
18
college and university professors. Teachers enjoy two legally
protected types of academic freedom. First, they have the substantive
right to choose a teaching method that serves a demonstrated
educational purpose. Second, courts acknowledge a procedural right
to not be discharged for using a teaching method that was not
proscribed by a regulation, or for which, if forbidden, there was not
adequate notice given of the restriction.19

16. Krizek v. Bd. of Educ., 713 F. Supp. 1131, 1137 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Grice, supra note 10, at
1995.
17. Grice, supra note 10, at 1995.
18. E.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“Our
Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value
to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is . . . a special concern of
the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom.”); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (D. Mass. 1971) (“[A] public school
teacher has not only a civic right to freedom of speech both outside and inside the schoolhouse,
but also some measure of academic freedom as to his in-classroom teaching.” (citations
omitted)).
19. Mailloux, 323 F. Supp. at 1390.
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Despite the judicial recognition of academic freedom, though,
the idea has not been extended beyond colleges and universities to
secondary and elementary schools, and there is some question as to
whether the doctrine extends beyond normal First Amendment free
speech rights. The courts’ reluctance to expand academic freedom
rights to secondary and elementary school teachers results from the
age and maturity of the students involved and the aforementioned
dueling purposes of public schools to expose students to various ideas
while inculcating them with societal values.20 Colleges and
universities, on the other hand, can focus exclusively on the former
goal because of the relative maturity of their student audience. At
least one court has held, however, that to the extent that there are
any academic freedom rights beyond normal First Amendment
freedom of speech, that right adheres to the college or university as a
whole, rather than individual professors.21 The Fourth Circuit held
that academic freedom is a professional norm, not a legal right, and
there is no right to academic freedom that extends beyond protection
against dismissal for the exercise of one’s First Amendment rights.22
Under this holding, the two types of recognized academic freedom
are imbedded in normal First Amendment rights, not a special right
to academic freedom.23 In support, the court notes that the Supreme
Court has never set aside a state regulation on the ground that it
24
infringed upon the First Amendment right to academic freedom.
Because most courts do not recognize a separate constitutional right
to academic freedom, this Note will focus exclusively on the
protection of instructional teacher speech by the more general First
Amendment freedom of speech that all citizens enjoy.
B. Schools’ Interests in Regulating Speech as Public Employers
A school system’s interest in restricting its employees’ speech
differs significantly from the state’s interest in regulating the speech

20. Grice, supra note 10, at 1995.
21. E.g., Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Our review of the law,
however, leads us to conclude that to the extent the Constitution recognizes any right of
‘academic freedom’ above and beyond the First Amendment rights to which every citizen is
entitled, the right inheres in the University, not in individual professors . . . .”).
22. Id. at 411.
23. See id. at 412 (explaining that, to the extent the Supreme Court has recognized a right
of academic freedom at all, it is an institutional right to self-governance in academic affairs, and
thus not a right of the individual professor).
24. Id.
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25
of ordinary citizens. The government can regulate the content of
expression when it is the speaker and when it enlists private entities
to communicate its message.26 That is, when the government
appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own, it
is entitled to say what it wishes, and when the government assigns
public money to private entities to transmit its message, it “may take
legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither
garbled nor distorted.”27 In the classroom context, this means that
when the government funds speech with the goal of promoting a
diversity of viewpoints (rather than the government’s own view), it
cannot restrict that speech.28 The question, of course, is to what
degree the government can restrict speech when it is paying teachers
to both transmit its own message and to expose students to various
viewpoints.

C. Protecting Students’ Right to Hear
The primary justification for recognizing protection of teachers’
instructional speech is to defend the interest of the teacher in
speaking on societal issues and/or influencing the curriculum. At least
one federal court has suggested, however, that students’ right to hear
may serve as a basis for protecting teachers’ right to speak.29 Under
that theory, safeguarding teacher instructional speech is mainly for
the benefit of the students and community.30 This intersects with the
goal of the public school system to expose students to various ideas in
an effort to foster intellectual curiosity and independent thought.
Regulating teacher speech, the argument goes, deprives students of
the diversity of views necessary to further their intellectual
development and leaves them unprepared for the unfiltered
cacophony of ideas outside the schoolyard.

25. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)
(recognizing that “when the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices”); Victor v.
McElveen, 150 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The government has legitimate interests in
regulating the speech of its employees, however, that differ significantly from its interests in
regulating the speech of people generally.”).
26. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833.
27. Id. (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196–200 (1991)).
28. See id. at 834 (“It does not follow . . . that viewpoint-based restrictions are proper when
the University does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead
expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.”).
29. Krizek v. Bd. of Educ., 713 F. Supp. 1131, 1137 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
30. Id.
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D. The Two Tests: Pickering and Hazelwood
Because the Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the
matter of First Amendment protection for teachers’ in-class speech,
lower courts generally use one of two tests developed by the Court in
other contexts:31 Pickering v. Board of Education,32 and Hazelwood
33
School District v. Kuhlmeier. Discussed in greater detail in Parts II
and III, respectively, the facts of Pickering have to do with out-ofclass speech by a teacher to a much broader audience than students,34
35
while Hazelwood deals with student speech. The use of the tests set
forth in Pickering and Hazelwood demonstrates the difficulty of
deciding instructional teacher speech cases without a clear Supreme
Court precedent. Neither fact pattern is an ideal starting point for
espousing a test to decide whether in-class speech by public school
teachers is protected by the First Amendment.
II. THE PICKERING TEST
Although Hazelwood has become the dominant test for
instructional speech cases, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have both
used the Pickering test of whether the speech in question involves a
matter of public concern.36 First, in Pickering v. Board of Education a
public school teacher was fired for sending a letter to a local
newspaper critical of the way the school board and superintendent
had handled past proposals to raise new revenue.37 The Court used
the test of whether the teacher’s speech was made as a citizen
commenting on matters of public concern, as opposed to as an
employee speaking on matters of private concern, to decide whether
the letter in question was protected by the First Amendment.38 Once

31. Grice, supra note 10, at 1975; Zavala, supra note 10, at 499.
32. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
33. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
34. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564–65.
35. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260.
36. Gary Young, Teaching English in English: It’s the Law, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 24, 2001, at
B6, available at http://onenation.org/0109/092401.htm.
37. Id. at 564–65.
38. See id. at 568 (stating that public school teachers may not be constitutionally compelled
to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise have as citizens to speak on
matters of public concern); Grice, supra note 10, at 1975–76 (“[Courts applying Pickering] have
determined that when a teacher—a government employee—is speaking as a citizen on a matter
of public concern, her speech is protected under the First Amendment, but when she is speaking
as a government employee about her own personal interest, her speech is not protected.”
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it decided that the speech was on a matter of public concern, the
Court balanced the interest of the teacher in making the statement
against the interest of the government as an employer in promoting
39
the efficiency of the public services it provided. Ultimately, the
Court held that there was no legal basis for the teacher’s dismissal
because the speech regarded a matter of public concern, the teacher’s
interest in making the statement outweighed the state’s interest in
restricting it, and the comment was not reckless or knowingly false.40
Under the Pickering test, if a teacher’s speech is not on a matter
41
of public concern, a school can constitutionally regulate it. If the
speech involves a matter of public concern, however, the court uses a
balancing test to decide whether the school’s interest as an employer
in workplace efficiency and lack of disruption outweighs the teacher’s
interest in expression.42 The Pickering test aims to recognize the
enhanced interest of schools in regulating the speech of their
employees while not allowing administrators to compel teachers “to
relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as
citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection with
the operation of the public schools in which they work.”43
A. Rationale for Applying the Pickering Test
Pickering protects the right to comment on matters of public
concern because doing so is “‘more than self-expression; it is the

(footnotes omitted)); Zavala, supra note 10, at 500 (“Under Pickering, a public employee’s
speech effectively ‘receives no First Amendment protection unless it involves a matter of public
concern.’” (quoting Cal. Teachers Ass’n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1149 n.6 (9th Cir.
2001))). But see Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (“We do not suggest, however, that
[plaintiff’s] speech, even if not touching upon a matter of public concern, is totally beyond the
protection of the First Amendment.”).
39. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568–69 (“The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance
between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees.”); Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 777 (10th Cir. 1991)
(“Pickering established a test that first asks whether a public employee’s expression addresses a
matter of public concern and then balances that employee’s interest in making the statement
with the interests of the government in ‘promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs.’” (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568)).
40. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574.
41. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
43. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; see also Clarick, supra note 14, at 699 (comparing the
school’s interests as an employer with the teacher’s interests as a citizen).
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44
essence of self-government.’” The right to lend one’s voice to the
debate on public issues is fundamental to democracy.45 The courts
that use the Pickering analysis recognize this weighty interest and
hold that a public employees do not have to relinquish their First
Amendment rights to comment on matters of public concern by
virtue of government employment.46
Competing with the citizen-teacher’s right to speak on matters of
public concern is the school’s interest in ensuring workplace
efficiency as well as employee discipline and harmony.47 Under
Pickering, this employer interest outweighs teachers’ interests in free
expression when the speech does not involve a matter of public
48
concern, and the school can thus regulate the speech. When teacher
speech implicates the significant First Amendment interest of
commenting on a matter of public concern, the school’s interest as an
employer does not disappear, but must be balanced against the
teacher’s right.49 This structure for deciding whether speech is
protected takes into account the interests of both parties.50 It does not
lightly dismiss teacher creativity and the need to foster debate within
the classroom in the name of employee discipline and the school

44. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,
75 (1964)).
45. See id. (recognizing the importance of the First Amendment right to comment on
matters of public concern).
46. E.g., Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (“To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court’s
opinion [suggests] that teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First
Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public
interest . . . , [that premise] has been unequivocally rejected in numerous prior decisions of this
Court.”); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967) (“[T]he
theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any
conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.” (citation omitted));
Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 406 (4th Cir. 2000) (“It is well settled that citizens do not
relinquish all of their First Amendment rights by virtue of accepting public employment.”
(citation omitted)).
47. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
48. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (highlighting the distinction between a
teacher speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern and a teacher speaking as a
government employee).
49. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
50. See Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 801–02 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Our
decision should not be misconstrued as suggesting that a teacher’s creativity is incompatible
with the first amendment, nor is it intended to suggest that public school teachers foster free
debate in their classrooms only at their own risk or that their classrooms must be ‘cast with a
pall of orthodoxy.’”).
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51
administration’s conception of workplace efficiency. Nor does the
test derogate the employer’s interest out of hand in response to any
claim of First Amendment privilege by a teacher.

B. Defining Matters of Public Concern
To prevail under Pickering, plaintiffs must almost invariably
prove that their speech touches on a matter of public concern and
that their interests in expression as citizens outweighs the state’s
interest as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.52 Nonetheless, the
question of what qualifies as a matter of public concern remains.
Generally, speech involves a matter of public concern when it relates
to an issue of “political, social, or other interest to a community.”53 To
determine whether speech meets that test, courts examine the
“content, form, and context” of the speech in light of the entire
record,54 with the content superseding form and context in
importance.55 Even if a public employee does not communicate in the
form or context of a public airing, the speech touches on a matter of
public concern so long as the content relates to a social, political, or
other community concern.56 While public employees need not make a
public announcement for the speech to touch upon a matter of public
concern, they cannot simply remain mute, internalize their concerns
about censorship, and afterwards contend that their speech was on a
57
matter of public concern. For example, a public school teacher may
not remain quiet about what she perceived as unconstitutional
censorship of her teaching until her employment contract was not
renewed and still receive protection under Pickering.58 Even though

51. Id.
52. See Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1048 (6th Cir. 2001) (giving the
requirements for a public employee to establish a claim of First Amendment retaliation).
53. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 406 (4th
Cir. 2000).
54. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48; Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 406.
55. Grice, supra note 10, at 1978.
56. See Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1052 (“[E]ven if a public employee were acting out of a private
motive with no intent to air her speech publicly. . . so long as the speech relates to matters of
‘political, social, or other concern to the community,’ as opposed to matters ‘only of personal
interest,’ it shall be considered as touching upon matters of public concern.” (quoting Connick,
461 U.S. at 146–49)).
57. Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989).
58. Id. at 799–800.

04__KUHN.DOC

2006]

10/4/2006 1:10 PM

TEACHER INSTRUCTIONAL SPEECH

1005

context and form are normally not the primary issues, they are
considered in the analysis.
Some courts have held that whether the speech in question is
primarily made in the public employee’s role as a citizen or an
employee, i.e. the speech’s context or form, is critical to the
59
determination of whether the speech concerns a public matter.
Other courts have expressly disclaimed this position, contending that
the speaker’s role is less important than the actual content of the
speech. In other words, these courts consider whether the content of
the speech actually involves matters related to the community’s social
and political concerns, rather than matters of private interest.60 Under
the latter inquiry, it is possible for speech to be “mixed,” where the
communication is made not only in the roles of both citizen and
employee, but also involves matters of both public and private
61
concern. So long as any part of the speech relates to matters of
public concern, the court must use the Pickering analysis and its
associated balancing test.62
As critics of the Pickering test note, a focus on the employee’s
role leads to an essentially predetermined outcome for teacher speech
cases.63 That is, if one contends that anytime an employee is being
paid to speak he is acting in his role as an employee, the First
Amendment would afford essentially no protection for teacher
instructional speech because the very act of teaching is what the
employee is being paid to do.64
The guidelines for describing a matter of public concern
discussed above are beneficial as general rules, but “[t]he definition
65
of ‘matters of public concern’ is imprecise,” so concrete examples of
qualifying and nonqualifying speech might be more useful. Examples
of public employee speech touching upon matters of public concern

59. E.g., Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 407.
60. E.g., Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1052.
61. Id. at 1052 n.5.
62. Id.; see also Rahn v. Drake Ctr., Inc., 31 F.3d 407, 411 (6th Cir. 1994).
63. See id. at 1051 (criticizing the Fourth and Fifth Circuits for deciding that when teachers
are choosing a curriculum, they are speaking as employees on a private matter, rather than as
citizens on matters of public concern).
64. See id. at 1051–52 (“Thus, when teaching, even if about an upcoming presidential
election or the importance of our Bill of Rights, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits’ reasoning would
leave such speech without constitutional protection, for the teacher is speaking as an employee,
and not as a citizen.”).
65. Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 798 (5th Cir. 1989).
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include: a public school teacher sending a letter to the local
newspaper critical of the school administration’s past handling of
66
proposals to raise new revenue; a public school teacher inviting a
67
presenter on industrial hemp to her class; and a deputy sheriff
criticizing his superior for possible racial discrimination.68 Illustrations
of speech not held to be touching a matter of public concern include:
a district attorney disbursing a questionnaire about workplace morale
to fellow employees that implied misconduct by her superior;69 a
public school teacher’s silence about what she perceived as
unconstitutional censorship of her teaching until her employment
contract was not renewed;70 and professors accessing sexually explicit
materials on state computers.71 Perhaps the difference between the
courts’ decisions is that speech held as touching upon matters of
public concern addresses macro, community-wide issues like school
funding, substance legalization, and racism. On the other hand,
unprotected speech relates to more private concerns like intraoffice
politics.
C. The Balancing Test
Once a court has answered the threshold question of whether the
speech in question touches upon a matter of public concern, it
balances the interest of the employee in commenting on such matters
against the interest of the state employer in delivering efficient public
services.72 Thus, a public school that retaliates against a teacher
engaging in speech involving a public concern does not automatically
violate the First Amendment.73 In administering the balancing test,
courts “‘consider whether an employee’s comments meaningfully

66. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571 (1968).
67. Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1051.
68. Victor v. McElveen, 150 F.3d 451, 455–56 (5th Cir. 1998).
69. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983).
70. Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 799–800.
71. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 409 (4th Cir. 2000).
72. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568–69 (1968) (“The problem in any case is
to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”); Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch.,
944 F.2d 773, 777 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Pickering established a test that first asks whether a public
employee’s expression addresses a matter of public concern and then balances that employee’s
interest in making the statement with the interests of the government in ‘promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs.’” (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 563).
73. Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 799.
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interfere with the performance of her duties, undermine a legitimate
goal or mission of the employer, create disharmony among coworkers, impair discipline by superiors, or destroy the relationship of
74
loyalty and trust required of confidential employees.’”
Many of the considerations embedded in the balancing test are
the same, or at least tangential to, the analysis of whether speech is
related to a matter of public concern in the first place. The factors in
the balancing test turn on whether the court defines the speech as
commenting on matters of public concern. Taking an example from
above, if a court decides that the speech of a public school teacher in
writing a letter to the local newspaper criticizing the administration
about school funding implicates a matter of public concern (funding
of schools) instead of the private concern of intraoffice squabbling, it
is unlikely to find that it “meaningfully interferes with the
performance of her duties, undermines a legitimate goal or mission by
the employer”. Likewise, in holding that professors’ criticism of a
state policy on internet access implicates a purely private interest, the
court may be focusing on the speech’s “meaningful[] interfer[ence]”
with the performance of the professors’ duties. How a court
characterizes speech as either a matter of public or private concern
likely goes a long way toward determining whether the interests of
the employer or employee outweigh the other. In essence, the
threshold and balancing tests are not clearly distinct from one
another.
Although speech that involves matters of public concern rarely
causes any of the work interferences triggering the balance of
interests to shift in the employer’s favor, it sometimes might. For
example, the balancing test would deny protection to speech in
situations where “the need for confidentiality between the
governmental employer and employee is so great, or the relationship
is so personal and intimate in nature, that public criticism of the
employer may furnish grounds for dismissal without violating the first
75
amendment.” Thus, the government is justified in restricting
intelligence officers from publicly speaking about antiterrorism
operations because of the absolute necessity for confidentiality. A
school’s interest will rarely outweigh a teacher’s in the educational

74. Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1053 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Williams v. Kentucky, 24 F.3d 1526, 1536 (6th Cir. 1994)).
75. Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 799 (discussing Pickering’s recognition of the need to balance
competing interests).
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context though, because as Justice White writes in his separate
opinion in Pickering:
The State may not fire the teacher for making [innocently or
negligently false statements involving a matter of public concern]
unless, as I gather it, there are special circumstances, not present in
this case, demonstrating an overriding state interest, such as the
need for confidentiality or the special obligations which a teacher in
76
a particular position may owe to his superiors.

Justice White also dissented in part to protest the majority’s
refusal to decide whether a knowingly or recklessly false statement
that touches upon a matter of public concern is protected under the
First Amendment if the statement had none of the “harmful effects”
of interfering with the operation of the school or the individual
teacher’s duties.77 The majority had stated that because the statements
in Pickering were not knowingly or recklessly false, they could not
decide that question.78 Justice White contended that “deliberate or
reckless falsehoods” deserve no protection under the First
Amendment regardless of whether there were any harmful
consequences therefrom.79 Again, the issue of how a court defines
speech as relating to a matter of public concern rears its head. If a
statement is knowingly or recklessly false, it likely will not be found
to legitimately comment on a matter of public concern, thus
precluding First Amendment protection. However, if a court does
find it to be touching on a matter of public concern, the court will
probably have already decided that there was little harm incurred
from the statement, hijacking the balancing test in favor of protection.
D. Criticism of the Pickering Test
The most important criticism of applying Pickering to
instructional speech cases is that the facts of the case do not exactly
correspond to teacher speech within the classroom.80 As a result, the
case is an inappropriate starting point from which to analyze the
76. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 582 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. Id. at 583.
78. Id. at 575 n.6 (majority opinion) (“Because. . .appellant’s statements were not
knowingly or recklessly false, we have no occasion to [examine] whether a statement that was
knowingly or recklessly false would, if it were neither shown nor could reasonably be presumed
to have had any harmful effects, still be protected by the First Amendment.”).
79. Id. at 583–84 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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81
constitutional protection of instructional speech. Pickering provides
protection for a teacher’s political expression in public, but does not
directly deal with in-class speech or the right of students to hear
82
diverse viewpoints in the classroom. Because Pickering involved
speech outside the classroom, its test fails to account for the
importance of social value education and exposure to diverse
opinions.
Second, the constitutionality of classroom speech regulations
should not hinge upon the public or private nature of the speech
because, whether public or private, teachers’ speech gives students
ideas that may be part of the public debate and educates students
83
about the process of rational discourse. Thus, while a teacher’s
speech may not touch on a matter of public concern, it still has a
significant effect on society by instructing students on the process of
public debate and exposing students to ideas they might encounter
therein.84 This criticism returns to the idea that the Pickering test does
not reflect the goal of exposing students to diverse ideas. A test
primarily concerned with the subject matter of the speech cannot
account for the message’s inherent positive value, regardless of the
content.

III. THE HAZELWOOD TEST
A. The Evolution of Hazelwood
Lower courts have used the test enunciated in the 1988 case
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.85 In that case, the student
staff of a high school newspaper claimed First Amendment
infringement for administration censorship of their articles.86 The
Court found that the administration could restrict the students’
speech so long as the actions of the educators were “reasonably
related to a legitimate pedagogical concern.”87 Thus, for the
81. Clarick, supra note 14, at 701.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 702 (offering that instead, “the extent of permissible regulation of a teacher’s
speech” should be determined by “the special concerns accompanying a teacher’s in-class
speech”).
84. Id.
85. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
86. Id. at 260.
87. Id. at 273.
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restriction to be valid, the school’s pedagogical interests must be
identified and evaluated as to their legitimacy, and the school’s
actions must reasonably relate to the pedagogical interests it has
88
identified. Unlike in Pickering, the Court in Hazelwood decided that
there was no violation of First Amendment rights because the
regulation of speech was valid as a protection of the school’s
89
pedagogical interests.
The First, Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have
90
adopted the Hazelwood test to decide instructional speech cases. In
these circuits, schools can regulate in-class teacher speech for reasons
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.91 Hazelwood
addressed student speech in a high school newspaper, rather than in92
class teacher speech. Hazelwood was first transposed from student
speech cases to elementary school teacher speech cases in the Tenth
93
Circuit. There, the court cited the case to support the holding that, in
general, if in-school speech is “part of the school curriculum or
school-sponsored activities,” it is subject to greater restriction than
personal expression such as the protest armbands in Tinker.94 The first
instance of Hazelwood being used in a higher education case was in
the Eleventh Circuit.95 The court extended the Tenth Circuit’s earlier

88. Grice, supra note 10, at 1986.
89. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260–61.
90. Young, supra note 36, at B6.
91. Id.
92. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 260 (1988).
93. See Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1059 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding the action of
school authorities forbidding a fifth grade teacher from keeping two religious books in his
classroom library and reading from the Bible during the class silent reading period).
94. In distinguishing between in-class and out of class speech, the Roberts court held:
We find no reason here to draw a distinction between teachers and students where
classroom expression is concerned. Thus, if the speech involved is not fairly
considered part of the school curriculum or school-sponsored activities, then it may
only be regulated if it would ‘materially and substantially interfere with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.’ If, on the other
hand, the conduct endorses a particular religion and is an activity ‘that students,
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur
of the school,’ creating the requisite state action, then the activity infringes on the
rights of others and must be prohibited. (citations omitted).
Roberts, 921 F.2d at 1057; see also E. Edmund Reutter Jr., Academic Freedom Advisory: Be
Wary of the Long Arm of Kuhlmeier, 89 Educ. L. Rep. (West Publ’g Co.) 347, 348–49 (May
1994) (discussing the Tenth Circuit’s application of Hazelwood to elementary school teacher
speech).
95. See Bishop v. Aranov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1078 (11th Cir. 1991) (disallowing a university
professor from holding “optional” classes to espouse his religious views because terming the
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ruling by deciding that while student expression can be more easily
separated as independent from the school, teacher speech is more
likely to be taken as “directly and deliberately representative of the
96
school.”
The Tenth Circuit took another step towards blurring the line
between student and teacher speech when it first used Hazelwood in
97
a high school instructional speech case, despite the fact that the
parties agreed, both before the district court and on appeal, that the
98
issue was controlled by Pickering. There, the court justified using the
pedagogical concerns test because the state had distinctive
responsibilities as an educator, contending that while Pickering
protected the interests of the state as an employer, it did not
sufficiently recognize its interests as an educator.99 The court also held
that there was no reason to distinguish between in-class student and
teacher speech for the purposes of deciding whether it was protected
by the First Amendment.100 It stated that the school’s interests in
regulating classroom speech—for example ensuring that students
learned whatever lessons a particular exercise were designed to teach
without being exposed to materials unsuitable for their maturity
level—were implicated by both student and teacher expression.101
From the initial judicial leap that speech involving curricular concerns
is subject to greater school restrictions than ordinary classroom
speech, to the total amalgamation of student and teacher speech,
Hazelwood has steadily evolved as a standard for deciding
instructional speech cases.
B. The Impact of Hazelwood
Hazelwood marked a tipping point in the way the courts viewed
First Amendment instructional speech cases. Prior to Hazelwood,
when the Pickering test dominated, the vast majority of teachers

meetings so gave the illusion of official sanction, which might have unduly pressured students
into attending and adopting his beliefs).
96. Id. at 1073; see also Reutter, supra note 94, at 349 (observing that the Eleventh Circuit
characterized Roberts as founded on Hazelwood).
97. See Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 774 (10th Cir. 1991) (affirming summary
judgment against a First Amendment claim by a high school teacher who was disciplined for
comments made in class).
98. Reutter, supra note 94, at 350–51.
99. Id. at 351.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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alleging violations of their First Amendment rights prevailed in the
102
Most pre-Hazelwood cases emphasized teachers’
courts.
professional judgment and their right to academic freedom in the
classroom, rather than the right of the school as an employer to
regulate the speech of its employees.103 The cases generally turned on
the school’s lack of notice to the teacher of the speech restriction—
school officials having no policy prohibiting the teacher’s conduct,
acting after the fact, and then being displeased with a particular
assignment or discussion.104 In cases where the teacher’s First
Amendment claims were rejected, the administration generally had a
105
Since the
separate valid ground for supporting their action.
Hazelwood decision, though, only a few courts have applied the
106
Pickering test to in-class speech cases, with most courts opting for
the test established in the more recent Supreme Court decision.
C. The Importance of Notice
Notice is essential to instructional speech cases, like all First
Amendment speech regulation cases, because for a restriction of
otherwise free speech to be allowed, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires notice that the conduct or speech at
issue is prohibited.107 In order to avoid unconstitutionality on
vagueness grounds, such notice must be in a form that would allow an
102. Grice, supra note 10, at 1989.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1989–99; see Cary v. Bd. of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 541 (10th Cir. 1979) (Doyle, J.,
concurring) (finding lack of notice to be a decisive factor in suits that teachers won prior to
1979).
105. See Cary, 598 F.2d at 542 (Doyle, J., concurring) (citing Adams v. Campbell County
Sch. Dist., 511 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1975; Brubaker v. Bd. of Educ., 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974);
Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972).
106. See Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1187–88 (6th Cir. 1995) (applying the
Pickering public concerns test to a university basketball coach’s locker room speech employing
racial slurs); Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1012 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying the Pickering test to a
law school professor’s speech advocating legalization of marijuana and criticizing national drug
policy); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying the
Pickering test to a high school teacher’s supplementary reading list); Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911
F. Supp. 999, 1011 (W.D. Va. 1996) (applying the Pickering test to the speech of a university
professor because “the ‘significant interests’ discussed in Hazelwood that justify the
restriction . . . of teachers’ in-class speech, are not implicated to the same extent, if at all, in the
context of higher education”), aff’d per curiam 106 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table
decision).
107. See, e.g., Dean v. Timpson Indep. Sch. Dist., 486 F. Supp. 302, 309 (E.D. Tex. 1979)
(holding that a school district violated the due process rights of a public school teacher by firing
her without notice that her conduct was forbidden).
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108
average person to understand what conduct is prohibited. Because
proscription of teacher speech without prior notice could cause
educators to internally censor their speech out of fear, thus defeating
the goal of exposing students to a variety of ideas, courts stringently
apply the vagueness doctrine in instructional speech cases.109 While a
school must be clear in its notice to teachers of prohibited material, it
110
need not detail exactly what is offensive about the restricted speech
or expressly prohibit every imaginable inappropriate conduct.111
Indeed, courts have directly rejected the notion that school
administrations should try to proscribe all conceivable offending
behaviors because it would be impossible to do so.112
In one post-Hazelwood decision, a federal court went so far as to
separate the universe of instructional speech cases into two groups—
those where the teacher’s action violates the administration’s
predetermined curriculum content rules (notice given), and those
where the teacher is disciplined for his expression despite the fact that
113
it violated no specific administrative rule (no notice). The court held
that if notice was given, the teacher had no redress because the
school’s decision to censor that content was within its right to control
the curriculum.114 The disciplinary action taken by the school was not
in response to the teacher’s exercise of his First Amendment rights,

108. See id. at 305 (finding that a teacher was not given sufficient notice because “either [the
teacher] was never issued a warning . . . or the warning was of an ambiguous or vague nature,
such that a reasonably prudent person could not discern what conduct the warning sought to
prevent”).
109. See id. at 309 (“Governmental regulation of First Amendment activities has
traditionally been required to be precise. An offhand comment to [the teacher], the meaning of
which was likely to be vague or ambiguous, cannot pass Constitutional muster . . . .” (citation
omitted)).
110. See Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1542 (7th Cir.
1996) (“[W]e reject [plaintiff’s] implication that a school must spell out in intricate detail
precisely what is ‘libelous or obscene language’. . . or which materials ‘will greatly disrupt or
materially interfere with school procedures and intrude into school affairs or the lives of
others.’” (quoting RACINE UNIFIED SCH. DIST., CODE OF STUDENT RESPONSIBILITIES AND
RIGHTS § 6144.11 (1994–1995))).
111. Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 454 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[W]e do not hold that a school must
expressly prohibit every imaginable inappropriate conduct by teachers.”).
112. Id.; Krizek v. Bd. of Educ., 713 F. Supp. 1131, 1140 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
113. Krizek, 713 F. Supp. at 1137–38 (noting that the “two types of cases involving teachers’
expression in the classroom” are “cases involving curriculum content rules promulgated by the
school administration and challenged by teachers” and “cases where a teacher is disciplined for
expression in the classroom, despite the fact that the expression in question violated no specific
rule”).
114. Id. at 1139.
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115
but rather to his flaunting a legitimate administrative rule. If, on the
other hand, the teacher had notice, the court must decide whether
regulation of the speech after the fact was reasonably related to a
116
legitimate pedagogical concern. Although few cases turn so strongly
on the presence of notice alone, it is an important factor throughout
the case law.

D. The Rationale for Using the Hazelwood Test
Courts justify using the Hazelwood test to decide instructional
speech cases instead of Pickering because it appears to better
recognize the interests of the state as an educator, rather than as an
117
employer. They contend that First Amendment speech cases in a
school environment deserve a different standard than the Pickering
test because, while the public concerns test may work in more general
settings, the right of a public employee to participate as a citizen in
the public debate is “less forceful” in the public school context.118
Thus, the judgment of school administrators merits more deference in
119
regulating the in-class speech of teachers than Pickering provides.
Other courts have extended Hazelwood’s deference to regulation
into the teacher speech context by focusing on the state’s interests in
ensuring that students learn their intended lessons without being
exposed to material inappropriate for their maturity level, and that
the views of the speaker are not erroneously attributed to the
120
school. Further, the school’s interest in “preventing interference
with the day-to-day operations of its classrooms” gives the
administration reign to establish the focus and boundaries of the
general subject matter of the curriculum.121 In short, courts apply the
Hazelwood test rather than Pickering because it appears better
tailored to the school environment. As a result, courts place more

115. Id.
116. See id. at 1142–43 (adopting the Hazelwood test in a case of speech regulation without
prior notice).
117. E.g., Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 777 (10th Cir. 1991).
118. Id.
119. See id. (“Because of the special characteristics of a classroom environment, in applying
Hazelwood instead of Pickering we distinguish between teachers’ classroom expression and
teachers’ expression in other situations that would not reasonably be perceived as schoolsponsored.”).
120. E.g., Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993).
121. Bishop v. Aranov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1073 (11th Cir. 1991).
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emphasis on the role of teacher speech regulation in creating a
conducive educational setting.
E. The Classroom is not a Public Forum
The Supreme Court has recognized that regardless of the public
employer’s interest in regulating the speech of its employees, schools
cannot restrict speech in public fora based on the message’s
122
viewpoint. In fact, “[i]t is axiomatic that the government may not
regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it
123
Once a school creates a public forum, it cannot
conveys.”
discriminate against speech made in the forum because of its
124
message. Even if the forum is limited to the purposes for which it
was created, a school cannot exercise viewpoint discrimination.125
However, a school can exclude speech in a limited forum it created to
preserve the limits of the forum, but only on the basis of subject
matter rather than viewpoint.126 Under either Pickering or
Hazelwood, the analysis turns first on the threshold issue of whether
the classroom is a public forum where viewpoint discrimination is
forbidden.
Under Hazelwood, in the absence of a public forum a school may
limit speech in a school-sponsored activity so long as the limitation
127
reasonably relates to legitimate pedagogical concerns. On the other
hand, if the classroom constitutes a public forum, the school cannot
128
The Court in Hazelwood
exercise viewpoint discrimination.
129
addressed this question. It observed that public schools do not
possess “all of the attributes of streets, parks, and other traditional
public forums that, ‘time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
122. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(stating that the state cannot “exercise viewpoint discrimination, even when the limited public
forum is one of its own creation”).
123. Id. at 828.
124. Id. at 829.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 829–30 (“[W]e have observed a distinction between, on the one hand, content
discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum, and,
on the other hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed
against speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations.”).
127. Henerey ex rel Henerey v. City of St. Charles, Sch. Dist., 200 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.
1999).
128. See supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text.
129. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (observing that public
schools are generally not forums for public expression).
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assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
130
public questions.’” Schools can only be deemed public fora if the
administration has “‘by policy or by practice’” opened the facility “for
131
indiscriminate use by the general public.” A school cannot “‘create
a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but
only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public
132
discourse.’”
Although the Hazelwood Court did not specifically address
whether classrooms are public fora because of the factual limitations
of the case, its discussions of public school facilities in general have
133
led other courts to decide that classrooms do not qualify. One court
held that elementary school classrooms are not public fora because
while the verbal marketplace of ideas may be important for high
schools to expose students to various viewpoints, it is inappropriate
for the “delicate custodial and tutelary environment of an elementary
school.”134 This suggests that a spectrum of public fora may exist
where elementary schools can restrict the speech of teachers more
than high schools, and high schools may in turn impose greater
controls than colleges. This theory, however, is not borne out in the
case law, as classrooms, whether in elementary schools or universities,
have generally been held not to be public fora.135 Classrooms do not

130. Id. (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
131. Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)).
132. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985)).
133. For example, in Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004), the Tenth
Circuit explained:
Nothing in the record leads us to conclude that . . . [the school’s] classroom could
reasonably be considered a traditional public forum. Neither could the classroom be
considered a designated public forum, as there is no indication in the record that
“school authorities have ‘by policy or by practice’ opened [the classroom] ‘for
indiscriminate use by the general public,’ or by some segment of the public, such as
student organizations.”
Id. at 1285 (second alteration in original) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267); see also
Henerey ex rel Henerey v. City of St. Charles, Sch. Dist., 200 F.3d 1128, 1133 (8th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that a public school election was not a public forum when the school district did not
by policy or practice open campaigns to the public); Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson
Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1529–40 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding the district court’s conclusion
that an elementary school was not a public forum); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir.
1993) (finding that a ninth grade biology classroom was not a public forum); Bishop v. Aronov,
926 F.2d 1066, 1071 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that a public university’s classroom was not a
public forum).
134. Muller, 89 F.3d at 1539.
135. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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meet Hazelwood’s description of public fora as facilities or locations
136
used by the general public for assembly and public debate. Thus,
teacher in-class speech generally falls outside the public forum
prohibition against viewpoint discrimination. Though the circuits
have split on whether the Hazelwood test itself allows viewpoint
discrimination in the public school setting,137 such regulation is
generally not precluded in teacher instructional speech cases because
the classroom does not qualify as a public forum.
F. Defining Pedagogical Concerns
When deciding if speech restrictions implicate legitimate
pedagogical concerns, courts begin with the school’s interest in
138
regulating curriculum-related speech. Educational institutions can
exercise more control over curricular speech than over speech
relating to extracurricular activities because curricular speech is likely
to be identified with the administration and “bear a school’s
‘imprimatur.’”139 One court, however, has held that pedagogical
140
concerns are not limited to the academic. That is, in recognizing the
goal of public schools to inculcate social values, the state may regulate
employee speech involving traditional moral, social, and political
norms, like civility.141
At least one court has eschewed bright-line rules, suggesting that
the level of pedagogical concern should be decided on a case by case
basis, depending on the age and sophistication of the students, the
relationship between the teaching method and a valid educational

136. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
137. Susannah Barton Tobin, Note, Divining Hazelwood: The Need for a Viewpoint
Neutrality Requirement in School Speech Cases, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 217, 231 (2004)
(“Currently, the First, Third, and Tenth Circuits have stated that viewpoint discrimination is
permissible, despite the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence to the contrary
outside the context of schools. At the same time, the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have
indicated that viewpoint discrimination is not permissible.”).
138. See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1286 (defining school-sponsored speech as “‘expressive
activities’ that ‘may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum’” (quoting
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271)).
139. Id. at 1289.
140. E.g., Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 1989) (“The universe of legitimate
pedagogical concerns is by no means confined to the academic . . . .”).
141. Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1540 (7th Cir. 1996)
(“‘[P]edagogical concerns’ include not only the structured transmission of a body of knowledge
in an orderly environment, but also the inculcation of civility (including manners) and
traditional moral, social, and political norms.”).
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142
objective, and the context and manner of presentation. These
factors again point to an increasing spectrum of regulation where the
less sophisticated the students and the more the speech relates to an
educational objective, the greater the chance of constitutional
regulation. By adopting these factors and articulating the need for
notice of speech regulation, the First Circuit tempered the
considerable deference that courts using the pedagogical concerns
test give school administrations in regulating teacher speech since
Hazelwood.143
At least one court, the Fourth Circuit in Boring v. Buncombe
County Board of Education,144 has held that the definition of
pedagogical is “educational,” thus encompasses any speech relating to
145
the curriculum. As a result, schools in the Fourth Circuit may
regulate teacher speech without establishing the legitimacy of the
146
pedagogical concerns ostensibly behind the censorship. The court
cited public policy reasons for entrusting all curricular decisions to the
school administration while completely denying any free speech right
to the faculty.147 This is the ultimate in deference to school
administration—because any speech-regulating decision by the state
is by definition pedagogical, the state has an unlimited opportunity to
censor teacher speech without even offering evidence that the
restriction does, in fact, relate to legitimate pedagogical concerns.
The dissent in Boring argued that, while the administration has
final control over the school’s curriculum, that the limited First
Amendment protection allowed for teacher in-class speech should
148
fetter that authority. “By holding that public school administrators
can constitutionally discipline a teacher for in-class speech without
demonstrating, or even articulating, some legitimate pedagogical
concern related to that discipline, the majority extinguishes First

142. Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993).
143. See Reutter, supra note 94, at 354 (observing that “[t]hose who cherish responsible
academic freedom as a necessity for the future of the country can be somewhat encouraged by
the First Circuit’s discussion.”).
144. 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998).
145. Id. at 370.
146. Id. at 376 (Motz, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 371 (majority opinion) (“[I]t is far better public policy, absent a valid statutory
directive . . . , that the makeup of the curriculum be entrusted to the local school authorities . . . ,
rather than to the teachers, who would be responsible only to the judges, had they a First
Amendment right to participate in the makeup of the curriculum.”).
148. Id. at 375 (Motz, J., dissenting).
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Amendment rights in [public schools] where the Supreme Court has
149
directed they should be brought ‘vividly into operation.’” One critic
criticized the Fourth Circuit’s decision because it implies that public
school teachers have absolutely no First Amendment rights to control
curriculum.150 That commentator argued that both the teacher and
school have constitutionally protected interests in the developing
curriculum, and that the Fourth Circuit’s approach destroyed any
professional balance existing between employer and employee.151
While recognizing the relationship between curriculum and
pedagogical concerns, other courts have required the state to
demonstrate that the administration’s action in regulating the teacher
152
speech relates to a legitimate pedagogical concern. The Supreme
Court appears to have endorsed this approach in Hazelwood, by
recognizing that a particular curricular decision may have “no valid
educational purpose” and that in such a case, the First Amendment
rights of the speaker are directly implicated.153 The Eleventh Circuit
recognized that curricular programs, by definition, have pedagogical
purposes, but refrained from stating that every curricular decision
constitutes a legitimate pedagogical concern.154 In fact, it expressly
rejected the Fourth Circuit’s determination that the court must defer
to the administration’s decision and thus assume that the state’s
action relates to a legitimate pedagogical concern.155 Indeed, the
Fourth Circuit’s acceptance of that argument is extreme because it
defines pedagogical concerns in a way that virtually ensures the
constitutionality of teacher speech regulation by the state.
G. Criticism of Hazelwood
The Hazelwood dissent argued that allowing the state to restrict
student speech whenever the censorship is reasonably related to a
legitimate pedagogical concern could convert public schools into
“enclaves of totalitarianism that strangle the free mind at its

149. Id. at 380.
150. E.g., Grice, supra note 10, at 1970.
151. Id. at 2005.
152. Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Boring, 136 F.3d at 377
(Motz, J., dissenting).
153. 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
154. Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1322.
155. Id. (Motz, J., dissenting) (citing Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1321).
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156
source.” The same holds true when applying Hazelwood to teacher
speech cases. The broader the definition of pedagogical concerns, the
less authority teachers have to develop their own teaching material,
157
and the greater the chance of anxiety-driven self-censorship. Public
schools’ goal of exposing students to a diverse set of viewpoints and
ideas is at risk under holdings like the Fourth Circuit’s, where the
administration has total control over curricular decisions and the
courts provide no oversight to ensure that the actions of the state
actually further legitimate pedagogical concerns. Not only do the
teachers lose in the form of less freedom to speak and control
curriculum decisions, but the students suffer in terms of exposure to
ideas and intellectual development.
The very application of the Hazelwood standard to instructional
speech cases comes under fire from commentators who find it “as
ominous as it is questionable” that the test providing for greater
administrative control in teacher speech cases “was developed in the
context of student speech in supervised learning settings.”158 Indeed,
the first court to apply the Hazelwood standard to teachers engaged
in only the most cursory analysis, and failed to cite any First
Amendment precedent involving teachers.159 Creating a new standard
out of a case with dissimilar facts should be done with careful
explanation and thoughtful analysis of the connections between the
different contexts, but instead, the predominant test for deciding
instructional speech cases was tailored in response to student speech
concerns and applied to teachers with little regard for the
consequences.

IV. PROPOSAL: A HYBRID TEST
Given the problems inherent in using the Pickering and
Hazelwood tests to decide instructional speech cases, the public
would be better served by a reformulated test where restrictions on
content are held to a higher standard than restrictions on process. The
possible outcomes of this hybrid system can be examined through the
lens of the current Pickering and Hazelwood tests. Applying the

156. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 280 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation and internal quotations
omitted).
157. Reutter, supra note 94, at 354.
158. Id. at 353.
159. Id.
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Pickering public concerns test to content restrictions and the
Hazelwood pedagogical concerns test to process restrictions would
yield a system with greater educational diversity than using the
Hazelwood test for both types of restrictions.
This hybrid system would allow teachers to expose students to
matters of public concern while simultaneously permitting schools to
retain control over instructional methods. While permitting greater
educational diversity, the hybrid test would protect the state interests
in ensuring that students learn the lessons intended and are not
exposed to material inappropriate for their maturity level, and that
the views of others are not erroneously attributed to the school.
Schools could still restrict the substantive content of instruction
through the Pickering balancing test if the interest of the state in
promoting efficient public services through its employees outweighs
the interests of the teacher in speaking. schools, however, would have
substantially less control over the content of instructional speech than
if the Hazelwood test applied alone.
Applying the hybrid test to the Boring factual situation—where a
teacher was restricted from using a play about a dysfunctional family
because of the school’s obscenity concerns—the school could restrict
the process of using the play as a teaching method under the
Hazelwood standard, but could not restrict the teacher from
approaching the subject matter of poverty and mental illness. If,
however, the teacher were using the play to instruct students on a
particular type of theatrical drama, for example, rather than to discuss
poverty and mental illness, the school could restrict both process and
content, as the content would not rise to the level of a matter of
public concern.
The hybrid test would render a different outcome when applied
to the facts in Cockrel, where the court had held that, under the
Pickering test, the First Amendment protected a teacher who invited
Woody Harrelson to present to her class on industrial hemp. Because
the subject of industrial hemp rises to the level of a matter of public
concern, under the hybrid test the school could not restrict Cockrel
from speaking instructionally on the subject. The school, however,
could restrict the process by which Cockrel approached the subject if
the restriction was reasonably related to a pedagogical concern. For
example, the school could restrict the process of Cockrel inviting
Woody Harrelson to class because of concerns that the visit would
cause instructional distractions or security problems. Thus, Cockrel
could educate her class on industrial hemp as a matter of public
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interest, but would have to employ a method that satisfied the
school’s legitimate pedagogical concerns.
The relatively recent question of how public school teachers
should approach the first anniversary of the September 11 attacks
provides yet another example of how the hybrid test would be
applied. Around the first anniversary of September 11, the National
Education Association (NEA) and affiliates of the American
Federation of Teachers argued publicly over the best way to teach
160
about the attacks. The NEA suggested lesson plans that did not
assign blame for the attacks and recommended that teachers discuss
them in the context of “historical instances of American
161
intolerance.” The New York and West Virginia affiliates of the
American Federation of Teachers, among others, argued that the
lessons should deal directly with the facts of the attacks and not
“avoid explicit judgment about the aims and character of the
terrorists.”162
Many public school teachers used the NEA lesson plans to teach
about September 11 in the context of historical examples such as the
internment of Japanese-Americans after Pearl Harbor. The hybrid
test would not allow a school district to prohibit a high school teacher
from analogizing September 11 and the Japanese-American
internment because they are certainly matters of public concern
under Pickering. The school district, however, would be allowed to
proscribe a teaching method that implicitly or explicitly placed sole
blame on the American government for the 9/11 attacks by
characterizing U.S. intolerance as the lone precipitating factor. The
state’s pedagogical concern in preventing its employees from teaching
opinion as fact would be implicated by such an educational approach,
so it would be justified in applying a process restriction. If a high
school teacher introduced students to a balanced group of theories of
September 11 causation, of which American intolerance was one, and
identified the theories as such, the state would have a weaker
argument for a pedagogical concern justifying a process restriction.
In contrast, if an elementary school teacher attempted to use the
same balanced causation theory lesson plan to teach about the
attacks, the school would be more justified in a process restriction
160. See Ellen Sorokin, More Teachers Shun NEA’s 9/11 Lessons, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 24,
2002, at A01 (discussing the disagreement over the NEA’s proposed lesson plans).
161. Id.
162. Id.
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because of its pedagogical concern in protecting students from
material inappropriate for their age. Under the hybrid test, the
constitutionality of process restrictions would depend largely on the
context of the speech that would be proscribed. Courts would have to
carefully balance whether the speech would implicate legitimate
pedagogical concerns of the state, just as they must with both content
and process restrictions now analyzed under Hazelwood.
True, such a hybrid formulation would face the difficulty of
differentiating between process and content. Using the Boring
example again, a court would have to determine as a threshold matter
whether the play’s content itself is the substance of the instruction, or
if the play’s content is being used as a process to teach something else.
In reality, the play could be used for both its procedural and content
effects, making the hybrid test difficult to administer. Yet the current
tests are also difficult to administer and are not as well tailored to
dealing with the rigors of teacher speech cases.
Critics might also contend that because content and process are
inseparably intertwined, the Pickering prong would place no practical
limits on speech restrictions because they could still restrict process
under Hazelwood. Yet the hybrid test would give courts the flexibility
to provide some measure of protection to teachers approaching
matters of public concern in the classroom, in contrast to using the
more rigid Hazelwood pedagogical concerns test exclusively.
Without Supreme Court guidance on the issue, the circuits will
continue to struggle over which test best decides instruction speech
cases. Both the Pickering and Hazelwood tests suffer from the fact
that they were not created with teacher speech cases in mind, and
have been applied, or misapplied as the case may be, in an effort by
the judiciary to do the best with what it has. Using either of these
tests to decide instructional speech cases is like trying to fit a square
peg in a round hole.
On one hand, the Pickering test protects the interests of citizens
to participate in the public debate by commenting on matters of
public concern, but only to the extent that this interest outweighs the
state’s interest as an employer in restricting that speech. Of course, as
has been raised here, the question remains of whether the interest
balancing test is largely conclusory, for the same factors that define
speech as involving a matter of public concern suggest that the
teacher’s interests in speaking outweigh the state’s interests in
regulation. As commentators point out, the Pickering test may ignore
the goal of exposing students to various ideas by allowing regulation
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based on the content of the speech—whether it touches upon a
matter of public concern—instead of recognizing the inherent value
of all teacher speech in exposing students to ideas and educating them
about the process of rational debate.
CONCLUSION
Teacher speech restrictions raise provocative questions about the
educational process and its role in society. Most importantly, to what
extent do we value exposing public school students to diverse ideas in
order to further their intellectual development? Do we trust our
teachers to make the curricular decisions necessary to achieve this
goal? As the pendulum shifts from Pickering to Hazelwood, more
teacher speech is subject to regulation, and the public schools’ goal of
inculcating values begins to outweigh the goal of exposure to diverse
ideas. If society truly benefits from a more uniform educational
curriculum, where state conceptions of appropriate lessons trump a
broader teacher-led learning experience, the broad application of
Hazelwood accomplishes that goal. If, however, schools should be a
more diverse marketplace of ideas where teachers help students gain
critical thinking skills in order to prepare them to make independent
judgments as adults, the system may be approaching failure in that
endeavor. The problem of regulating instructional teacher speech
requires finding the balance between an educational system that is
primarily concerned with teaching the idea of democracy and an
educational system that aspires to be a democracy of ideas.

